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The last two decades have seen a massive increase in financial flows around the world, opening
up of emerging economies to international capital and creation of markets for financial instruments
that never existed before in some of these countries. Emerging market economies increased their
average gross external assets from 12.9 percent of GDP in 1985 to 26.7 percent in 1995 and to
53.7 percent in 2004 3. Average gross liabilities increased from 32.8 percent to 46.1 percent to 66.1
percent of GDP in the same years. In this world with progressively increasing capital flows, the
optimal level of de-jure openness and the design of domestic regulatory mechanisms are two key
policy issues facing policymakers in the emerging markets. Economies that realize the benefits of
greater risk sharing, and bear the brunt of volatility transmitted through external shocks and of
loss of independence in fixing the exchange rate and inflation, feel compelled to revisit their policies
of restricting or welcoming capital movements.
The theoretical argument in favor of greater capital flows is akin to that for free trade: it allows for
inter-temporal economic efficiency and risk sharing across countries. Moreover, longer term flows
in the form of FDI confer the benefits of technology transfer and increased competitiveness on
emerging markets. The caveat to these is provided by the theory of the second best, which argues
that in the presence of other distortions, an open capital market might not be welfare improving. In
practice, governments have used the latter argument to impose controls - to provide infant industry
protection to their domestic financial sectors, to allocate credit to favored sectors, to protect the
economy from external shocks. In practice also, the controls often become shelters for inefficiencies,
when they are not bypassed. The welfare implications of greater openness then become an empirical
question and crucial to answering it is a measure of financial integration.
3Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)
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Financial integration may be measured by de-jure or by de-facto measures. De-jure measures
identify openness with the lack of legal restrictions on capital account transactions by residents
and non-residents, while de-facto measures use information on the ground - on actual flows and on
price convergence. Neither of these alone provides full information and must be taken in conjunction
with the others in order to pin down reality. For example, private players often find ways to get
around capital controls ((Garber 1998), (Garcia 2006), (Aizenman 2004)). A country with legal
restrictions on every transaction in capital account could nevertheless find itself facing the full
impact of external shocks4. This is not just a theoretical possibility but a very real concern facing,
for example, India’s policy makers where there is a widespread belief among the practitioners that
Indian markets are much more integrated to the world economy than the government allows them
to be. In so far as the existing restrictions only make it hard to predict the outcomes of other
interventions accurately, while not fulfilling their stated objective of isolating the economy, they
need to be re-assessed. Here, a de-jure measure would understate the true degree of capital mobility
in the country and a de-facto measure would serve as a reality check.
De-facto measures of integration may be quantity measures or price measures. Quantity measures
simply measure the volume of capital flows and again, are less than perfect measures. To take an
example5, two countries could have zero barriers to capital mobility and zero capital flows between
them because they are identical and there is no uncertainty. Volume measures of capital mobility
would imply zero financial market integration. Yet, in so far as prices are equalized between them,
4Aditionally, capital controls may be masqueraded as prudential regulations. For example, India’s recent ban on
Participatory Notes, thus requiring all foreign investors to register with the Indian regulators was an attempt to stem
the inflows rather than to improve transparency. See also Kose et. al. (2006)
5Obstfeld and Taylor (2004)
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and more importantly because of free mobility, any deviation from equilibrium in either economy
would lead to equilibrating flows, the two markets should be considered perfectly integrated. On
the other hand, price measures alone are not unambiguous measures of financial market integration.
In our two economies above, if there were somehow erected barriers to disallow any trade or capital
flows, prices would still be equal in the two, albeit without any current or prospective capital flows.
The three kinds of measures of integration are therefore complementary.
There exist two widely used de-jure measures of financial integration, those constructed by Chinn
and Ito (2006) and by Edwards (2005) and a quantity measure constructed by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006). Price based cross-country measures of integration are rare and this paper seeks
to fill this gap. It constructs a measure of financial integration that ranks economies based on
the deviations from Covered Interest Parity (CIP) in the past decade or so. Modifications to CIP
condition in the presence of capital controls and their testable implications are derived. The analysis
combined with a limited supply of capital implies that measured deviations follow a Self-Exciting
Threshold Auto-regressive (SETAR) process whereby deviations that lie within an endogenously
determined neutral band are not self correcting and only deviations that constitute large enough
profit opportunities engender a flow of speculative capital. The SETAR model is estimated for all
emerging markets for which data was available and for some industrialized countries, for comparison.
The results are largely as predicted. My estimates of the boundaries of the neutral band (called the
thresholds) are non-trivial, asymmetric and are larger in the negative direction for countries known
to have imposed controls on capital outflows (Malaysia, India). Also as expected, the thresholds are
narrower and enclose a larger percentage of deviations in developed markets. Based on the estimated
model, I construct an index of de-facto integration and find that Philippines, Chile, Mexico and
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India are high ranked amongst emerging markets in terms of their financial integration, and Brazil,
Malaysia and South Africa are the least integrated. These results are largely consistent with the
findings of Francis, Hasan and Hunter (2002) who estimate a non-linear model to explain the
deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity for some EMEs. The developed markets have narrower
bands and fewer observations outside the bands - results consistent with previous studies on CIP
deviations for these countries((Frenkel and Levich 1975), (Rhee and Chang 1992), (Balke and
Wohar 1998)). The correlation between my index and the de-jure indices of Chinn and Ito (2006)
and of Edwards (2005) is high, but that between my index and the quantitative measure of Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) is low, affirming the earlier assertion that price measures are important
in assessing integration, that conditions on the ground - enforcement and incentives/opportunities
- matter for arbitrage and that the different measures won’t always agree.
CIP is a very commonly used measure of financial integration6, and has been validated
within limits set by transaction costs, in numerous studies for industrialized countries. Obstfeld
and Taylor (2004) compute covered interest differentials with monthly data vis--vis the Pound
Sterling for US and German markets for the period 1921-2003 and find that the differentials were
large between 1920 and 1980, but shrank considerably after 1980. Significantly, these differences
became lower post 1980 than they were at the peak of the Gold Standard. Other studies show
that these differentials have been falling since 1980. Frankel (1991) estimated a time trend in
6It is however, not a perfect measure. The modern theory of foreign exchange (Tsiang, 1959; Willett et. al.,
2002; Hallwood and MacDonald, 2000) argues that in the presence of less than perfectly elastic supply of capital, the
absence of deviations from CIP does not necessarily imply integration. This doesn’t make the CIP measure irrelevant,
only stresses that it be used in conjunction with quantity measures. My thanks to Thomas Willett for this comment.
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absolute value of covered interest differentials for 25 developed countries during the 1980’s and
found a statistically significant negative trend for 10 of those 25 countries. Other studies that
have estimated the differential and tested for presence of profitable opportunities outside of the
‘transfer points’ include Frenkel and Levich (1975), Rhee and Chang (1992), Clinton (1988),
Taylor (1989), Peel and Taylor (2002) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004). These transfer points
have been estimated variously through data on triangular arbitrage, bid-ask spreads and brokerage
fees and endogenously through a SETAR model, in Peel and Taylor (2002) and Obstfeld and
Taylor (2004). Popper (1993) and Vieria (2003) provide evidence that CIP more or less holds
even at longer maturities (more than one year). Deviations were found to be linked to out-of-line
fiscal policies.Balke and Wohar (1998) study covered interest differentials between US dollar and
UK pound for the period 1974-93 using TAR model, but instead of estimating constant thresholds,
they compute time-varying thresholds from those implied by the modified CIP conditions from
the data and then compute the AR coefficients for each regime econometrically. In this paper, I
estimate constant bands because as discussed below, capital controls and other frictions not entirely
captured by the bid-ask spreads also influence the thresholds. In emerging economies which are the
subject of my analysis, such restrictions have played a particularly important role. My estimates
of the bands would then be an average over the period. Branson and Taylor (2004) is a study of
covered interest parity between US and Russia, which finds large bands around the equality using
the TAR technique, but these bands are not symmetric. The lower bound is close to zero and the
upper bound, which involves borrowing in US dollars and lending in rubles to be large, about 1 per
cent. Below, I explain where the asymmetry may derive from. Bulk of the research on financial
integration in emerging economies has been confined to testing uncovered interest parity due to
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lack of conventional forward contracts and market data. With the development of such markets
in many of these economies since the late 1990’s, there is now enough data to explore the issue of
covered arbitrage and to compare the working of the newer markets to those in developed countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the theoretical and the empirical models
and the construction of the integration index, Section II describes the data and the summary
statistics for CIP deviations, Section III presents the results and Section IV concludes.
I. CIP in the Presence of Frictions
In a fully integrated world with perfectly competitive profit maximizing agents and no trans-
actions costs, the following CIP condition would hold in equilibrium:
δt =
(Ft+k − St
St
)− it+k − i∗t+k
1 + i∗t+k
= 0 (1)
where δt is the covered interest differential, it+k and i∗t+k are respectively returns on comparable
domestic and foreign assets between time t and t+k, St is the domestic currency price of foreign
currency, Ft+k is the forward rate or the kth period domestic currency price of foreign exchange
delivered in that period7. Since all the variables in the above equation are known a priori, any
deviation from this parity in our model world represents pure profits and therefore cannot exist in
a rational equilibrium8.
7When interest rates are annualized, the forward premium may be multiplied by a scaling factor (12 for one-month
data, 4 for 3-month data, etc) to get the CIP deviation in percent per annum terms. This approach is used here as
the deviations for different maturities are directly comparable with this method.
8Rubinstein(2000)
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However, in a world with oligopolistic players, underdeveloped money markets, exchange or capital
controls or risk of such controls, differential taxation, limited supply of capital, sovereign immuni-
ties, transaction costs and other inconveniences, forward rate may differ from current spot rate by
more than the interest differential, even with rational markets. The arbitrage conditions are then
modified in the manner discussed below. I start with some well known treatment of transactions
costs (Frenkel and Levich, 1975; Rhee and Chang, 1992; Balke and Wohar, 1998) and then move
on to a discussion of capital controls.
I.1. Transactions Costs and CIP
Assume that there are transactions costs in the foreign exchange market, encapsulated in a
positive bid-ask spreads on exchange rates. Denote by Fb the one-period forward bid rate for a
foreign currency, say the Chilean peso (CHP), expressed as USD per CHP. It is the number of units
of USD the investor gets when she sells forward one peso to a foreign exchange dealer. Denote by
Fa the forward ask rate for the peso9. Sa and Sb are the spot ask and bit rates. All exchange rates
are expressed as USD per unit of that currency and US is assumed to be the ‘home’ country. Let
i be the US interest rate of one period maturity, i∗ the foreign onshore interest rate of the same
maturity. A covered arbitrage that involves borrowing dollars to invest in pesos in this world will
be profitable if and only if:
δp =
Fb − Sa
Sa
− i− i
∗
1 + i∗
> 0 (2)
9Note that the bid rate for a currency is precisely equal to the inverse of the ask rate for USD in terms of that
currency. This last identity is used often in the succeeding analysis.
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An outflow from Chile and into US similarly is profitable if the following holds:
δn =
Fa − Sb
Sb
− (i− i∗) < 0 (3)
Since δp 6= δn, Covered Interest Parity now requires that the following hold:
δp ≤ 0 and δn ≥ 0 (4)
When CIP deviations are measured using the average of the bid and ask rates in the spot and
forward markets, as is often the case in emirical studies, the above condition modifies to the
measured differential (δˆ) satisfying:
δˆ =
F − S
S
− i− i
∗
1 + i∗
≤ F
S
− Fb
Sa
(5)
⇒ δˆ ≤ F
S
(1− Ωo) (6)
and
δˆ =
F − S
S
− i− i
∗
1 + i∗
≥ F
S
− Fa
Sb
(7)
⇒ δˆ ≥ F
S
(1− 1
Ωi
) (8)
giving the neutral band:
F
S
(1− 1
Ωi
) ≤ δˆ ≤ F
S
(1− Ωo) (9)
where Ωo = FbSa
S
F and Ωi =
Sb
Fa
F
S express transactions costs as a fraction of forward and spot
rates, as in Frenkel and Levich (1975). The latter assume Ωo = Ωi but as the definitions imply,
this not generally true. The right hand side of (6) is always positive as ask rates are higher than
corresponding bid rates and the right hand side of (8) is always negative. It is also possible to show
that the absolute value of κn is greater than κp, implying threshold asymmetry, when measured
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forward and spot rates are simple average of corresponding bid and ask rates. Also, the bandwidth
turns out to be FaSb −
Fb
Sa
which is wider than the wider of the two spreads, that on forwards (Fa−Fb).
Often, transaction costs in securities markets are more important than those in foreign exchange
markets (Rhee and Chang, 1992). Defining these to be symmetric as in Frenkel and Levich (1975),
and equal to t percent of transaction size in US and t∗ percent of transaction size in Chile, and
assuming that the foreign investor already holds foreign securities that yield i, the CIP condition
modifies to:
F
S
(
1− 1
ΩiΦ
)
≤ δˆ ≤ F
S
(1− ΩoΦ) (10)
where Φ = (1− t)(1− t∗) < 1, so that the neutral band is wider with transactions costs in securities
markets than without.
I.2. Capital Controls in Emerging Markets
The analysis above assumes that all distortions and costs are fully reflected in the bid-ask
spreads. In practice, this is not true. Countries often tax earnings from foreign investments at
different rates, impose taxes or reserve requirements on foreign capital flows for the explicit pur-
pose of encouraging or discouraging such flows and impose outright limits on transaction volumes,
among other measures. For example, Brazil increased tax payable by foreigners on fixed interest
investments from 5 per cent to 9 per cent between October 1994 and March 1995. Chile imposed
a stamp tax of 1.2 per cent per year on foreign loans, applicable on all credits in their first year,
except trade loans in 1991. In this section, I look at the implications of capital controls for the CIP
relationship, and how this relates it to my model.
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I.2.1. Tax on Inflows
Suppose there exists a tax τ on foreign inflows into Chile (the analysis is analogous for a tax
on outflows). Now, a foreigner investing X dollars in Chile can make a profit iff:
X(1 + i∗)(1− τ)ΦFb
Sa
≥ X(1 + i)
The CIP condition then modifies to:
F
S
(
1− 1
ΩiΦ
)
≤ δˆ ≤ F
S
[1− Ωo(1− τ)Φ] (11)
thus increasing the positive threshold. Moreover, if the Chilean investors take into account the fact
that their earnings abroad are taxed when they are repatriated back to Chile, they would require
the (absolute) differential to be larger before they take money out of Chile. In this way, the tax on
inflows could push down the negative threshold (or reduce the supply of arbitrage capital, or both),
widening the neutral band10. A tax on outflows would similarly widen the no-arbitrage band.
I.2.2. Reserve Requirements
Suppose, as in Chile between 1994 and 1998, there exists a requirement to keep as unremu-
nerated reserves, u per cent of every USD of inflow into the country. This amount is paid back
at time h, which let’s assume is greater than or equal to 1, the maturity period of our short term
speculative investment. Assume also that the return from investment is repatriated at the time the
investment matures and that interest rates are constant throughout (not realistic, but dropping this
assumption will only reinforce our results). At time 0, the choice being faced is between investing
10My thanks to Sergio Schmukler for this insight.
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a USD for h periods at the interest rate i or to invest 1−uSa at interest rate i
∗ for one period and
re-invest this in USD for h − 1 periods at interest rate i. Now, CIP requires that the following
hold11:
F
S
(
1− 1
Ωi
)
≤ δˆ ≤ F
S
[
1− Ωo(1− u)− Ωou(1 + i)k−1(1 + i∗)
]
(12)
when there are no transactions costs in securities markets and
F
S
(
1− 1
Ωi
)
≤ δˆ ≤ F
S
[
1− Ωo(1− u)Φ(1− t)− Ωou(1− t)(1 + i)k−1(1 + i∗)
]
(13)
when there are transactions costs in securities market. The upper threshold in (12) is unambiguously
greater than that without reserve requirements (1−Ωo) and increases with the duration of reserve
requirement relative to the horizon of investment. With transactions costs in securities markets,
assuming the investor has to sell home securities to invest in Chile and then again to buy them
after period 1, incurring a transaction cost each time, the positive threshold on CIP differential
will be higher with reserve requirements than without, as long as the transactions costs in the
foreign securities market are not too large and the reserve requirement isn’t too low12. In either
case, the threshold increases with the duration of the reserve requirement. Similarly, a reserve
requirement on capital outflows can be shown to push down the negative threshold. Other kinds
of restrictions, like regulatory and ’exposure requirements’13 will not only increase bandwidth (as
11This is in terms of USD at time h.
12This may seem counter intuitive but with transactions costs that are prohibitively high and interest rates that
are not too high, any inflow into Chile would exploit the forward spot differential and in this case a high reserve
requirement simply reduces the transactions costs incurred while allowing you to take a position on the currency,
thus narrowing the band.
13India currently imposes currency exposure requirements for access to onshore forward market for Indian rupee,
and requires all foreign investors to register with the SEBI.
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any quantitative restriction can be converted into an equivalent tax) but also throw ‘sands in the
wheel’ of international capital. The latter can be interpreted as a reduction in elasticity of supply
of capital, thereby reducing the speed with which any deviation outside threshold reverts back.
One can summarize the testable implications derived from the above discussion as follows:
1. The no-arbitrage band [κn, κp] is larger than the largest spread. This also implies that the
bands are wider during crisis periods when spreads are wider.
2. The thresholds are likely to be asymmetric around zero, with larger negative thresholds than
positive ones.
3. Taxes and quantitative controls on capital inflows increase the positive threshold, and controls
or taxes on outflows increase the absolute value of the negative threshold; and both types
of controls increase the bandwidth. This effect is more pronounced for shorter maturities.
Controls are also likely to reduce the elasticity of supply of arbitrage capital.
When supply of capital is less than perfectly elastic, CIP could be said to hold as long as any
deviation outside the band reverts back to the band. In the absence of market rationality, the
differentials could follow a non-stationary process even outside the bands. This leads us to the
SETAR model as a natural choice for testing integration: The wider the estimated thresholds and
the longer the time to correct a deviation outside the band, the lower the level of integration. I
describe this model and data in the next two subsections.
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I.3. Empirical Model
The Asymmetric Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregressive model (SETAR) is called ‘self-exciting’
because AR regime that is applicable this period depends on the value of the dependent variable
last period and ‘asymmetric’ because the negative threshold is allowed to differ from the positive
threshold. It takes the form:
δt = ρiδt−1 + it for κn < δt−1 < κp (14)
δt − κn = ρn(δt−1 − κn) + nt for δt−1 ≤ κn (15)
δt − κp = ρp(δt−1 − κp) + pt for δt−1 ≥ κp (16)
where jt ∼ N(0, σ2j ), j = i, n, p and κn and κp are the negative and positive thresholds respectively.
Note that this model assumes that speculative activity will push the deviations to the edges of the
band, rather than to its center. The AR(1) process within the band is allowed to be a random walk,
but the hypothesis of rational markets states that the AR(1) process outside the bands be stationary.
If the thresholds were known, the model could be estimated by ordinary least squares applied
separately to the inner regime and outer regime observations. But since the thresholds aren’t known,
they are estimated using a grid search over possible threshold combinations. All the percentiles
between the 5th and 95th percentiles are taken and separated into sets of negative thresholds
candidates and positive threshold candidates. The model then chooses the combination of negative
and positive threshold values that minimize the residual sum of squares. This estimation method
is called the constrained least squares. Another way to estimate the thresholds is by choosing the
combination of positive and negative threshold that maximizes a log-likelihood function, but this
assumes that residuals are normally distributed, an assumption that was violated for most countries
– 14 –
in my sample. The constrained least squares estimates are consistent and I also use Tsay (1989)
test to test for nonlinearity in the data14.
I.4. Integration Index
To construct the Integration Index, I take into account five different measures that derive
from the model. The first is the bandwidth, which measures the size of the no-arbitrage band, and
is expected to be wider the greater the transactions costs of effective controls in an economy. I
also use percentage of observations lying in the outer regimes(OutObs), the median positive and
negative deviation outside the measured band (MedDevNeg and MedDevPos respectively) and
the third quartile of continuous runs outside the band (3rdQuartile). These measures capture how
frequent are profitable deviations from intrest parity, and how fast they revert back to the band.
The more elastic the supply of capital, and the less effective the controls, the fewer the deviations
outside the band15 and the faster the reversion speed. One could also use the AR coefficients
in outer regimes or the half lives, but the results should be similar. Medians and quartiles are
preferable to average deviations as they are immune to outliers.
I first normalize each of the indicators mentioned above by subtracting from them their inter-
country mean and dividing by the standard deviation. The normalizations are done separately for
14Chan and Ng (2004) compare various tests for SETAR type nonlinearity and find that between Tsay(1989) and
Hansen(1996) tests, neither scores over the other in all situations. Both tests lose power and have inflated empirical
sizes in the presence of outliers. Given that Hansen(1996) requires substantially more involved computation and
doesn’t allow for regime dependent heteroskedasticity as in my model, I chose to use the Tsay test.
15Note that the paper uses daily data, so measured deviations are those that were present at the end of the day.
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the two maturities, one and three months. For Chile, Malaysia, Thailand and Mexico, for which
data on one of the maturities is not available, I use the available maturity’s data to approximate
for the missing maturity model16. Also, I only use non-crisis period observations in computing the
index. The Integration Index is:
Ij = −Bandwidthjn+OutObsjn+MedDevNegjn+MedDevPosjn+ 3rdQuartilejn5 (17)
where subscript j refers to the country and n to the fact that the variable has been normalized. The
negative sign allows larger values of the index to be interpreted as greater integration. Note that
this index is centered at zero and gives only an ordinal ranking. I compare this index with three
other available indices of financial integration/openness. The first one is constructed by Chinn and
Ito (2006) and is a de-jure measure of openness constructed using Principal Component Analysis.
The second is the updated index in Edwards (2005) and uses detailed information on de-facto
controls. The third is the quantitative measure of de-facto integration defined as the ratio of total
foreign assets and liabilities to GDP constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Note that the
last index measures the stock of foreign investments and therefore incorporates historical openness
as well as that in the last decade. Each of these indices is available yearly, up to 2004. I average
these for each of the countries over my sample period (1995-2004 for all the developed countries
and shorter for EMEs) to arrive at a single number which I then compare with my index.
16The analysis was repeated after dropping these four countries and the ranking of the rest of the countries are
identical relative to each other in the smaller sample.
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II. The Data
The US is treated as the home country in each equation. Interbank interest rates and onshore
forward exchange rates of one and three month maturities are used to construct the covered interest
deviations. The interbank rate used for the US is the US dollar LIBOR, from online database of
the Board of Governers of the Federal Reserve System. Forward rates and interest and exchange
rates of developed markets (excluding Hong Kong) are from Datastream and the rest are from
Global Financial Database. Data used is of daily frequency. Data from IMF’s International Finan-
cial Statistics was used for generating Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) index of currency market
turbulence, to identify crisis months. Crisis periods are defined as 6 months before and after the
crisis months. If two or more crisis months lie within 6 months of each other, then the entire period
from 6 month before the first crisis month to 6 months after the last crisis month is deemed the
crisis period. Crisis periods so identified are successful in isolating periods of sharply increased
deviations from CIP, as seen in figures (1) and (2) below. Only countries for which at least 2 years
of data was available were used in the analysis. The period of analysis is from the late 1990’s to
2006 for most countries, except for Hungry, whose daily data series stops in 2002 and Poland, Chile
and Brazil whose data begins in or after 2002. For developed economies and Singapore, longer data
series were available but were truncated to post-1995 period, to facilitate comparison with other
EMEs. The analysis admittedly excludes some important emergine economies, including Russia
and China, but the lack of data on them is itself a statement on their level of financial integration
with the rest of the world.
Tables 1 and 2 contain the summary statistics on CIP differentials for 1- and 3-month maturity
instruments respectively. The mean deviations for both maturities are significantly different from
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zero, except for UK (1-month) and perhaps Malaysia (1-month, non-crisis period). This is consistent
with CIP in a less than perfect world, as seen above and in Cheung et. al. (2003). Also, the mean,
variance and range of deviations do not move in the same direction, so that a more formal evaluation
of the parity condition is needed. The results of the Tsay (1989) test are presented in last columns
in the tables. The F-statistic tests the null hypothesis of no non-linearity in the data. The 10
percent critical value is 2.3 and almost all data series show strong evidence of non-linearity. CIP
deviations for all countries and maturities satisfied stationarity (Malaysia was a borderline case)
and the results are available on request.
III. The Results
Details of the estimated models are presented in Tables (3) to (6). On the whole, developed
markets have narrower bandwidths, fewer observations in outer regimes and smaller average devia-
tions outside thresholds. All of these are consistent with fewer controls and more elastic supply of
capital in these market. They also have closer estimates for the two maturities, which may again
reflect their deeper and more liquid markets for both maturities and less ad-hoc restrictions.
Consistent with the predictions in the theoretical section above and with the larger deviations
seen in crisis periods in figures (1) and (2) below, crisis period bands are wider than tranquil period
bands with the exception of Malaysia’s 1-month differentials17. Malaysia’s highly effective capital
controls introduced on September 1, 1998 complicate estimation. The controls managed to push
17Norway’s crisis period model could not be estimated because there were only four positive observations in the
entire period.
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the CIP differential to below 100 per cent per annum on October 28, 1998 and keep it at three
specific values all the way to August 1999, as clearly seen in figure (1.A). This means a lack of
variability in the data for one third of the crisis period, precluding precise estimation.
Among emerging markets, Chile, Mexico and Singapore (3-month) have the narrowest bands
and Philippines and Malaysia (both 1-month) the widest. Most EMEs have bands that are highly
asymmetric about zero, with larger negative thresholds than positive ones. The model therefore, is
able to capture the higher costs to borrowing in local currencies and lending in dollars imposed by
capital controls. Although we discussed only two types of capital controls in Section I above, this
prediction of enlarged bands when capital controls are imposed is true more generally. Given that
even well-enforced capital restrictions rarely involve a complete moratorium on foreign lending, they
only serve to make such transactions more expensive and harder (but not impossible) to undertake.
These can thus be translated into an effective tax, akin to the tax discussed in Section I, which any
CIP differential must additionally cover, to be profitable.
Often, the controls seek to (and are successful in18) changing the composition of capital flows
to longer maturities and therefore impose a higher effective tax on shorter term transactions, while
reducing the supply of speculative capital. This reduction in the supply of capital means that
the differentials would take longer to converge to the band edge. To see whether this happens
here, one can look at continuous runs (number of successive days for which the differential was
outside the same threshold) shown in columns (8) and (9) of Tables 3 and 4. The third quartiles of
consecutive runs for all countries are less than 4 (except for Malaysia (1-month)). This suggests that
most deviations, when they do occur tend to be corrected within a business week. All countries,
18Magud et. al. (2005)
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however, have seen at least one run that lasted a considerable period of time, the longest being
for Malaysia and Norway, with continuous runs of over a year. There seems to be a fair bit of
democracy here, with no clear difference between developed and emerging markets. The difference
seems to be in how large are the shocks to the differentials (given by the median deviations outside
thresholds), not how fast they are arbitraged away.
Furthur confirmation of this is in Tables (5) and (6), which contain the estimated AR(1)
coefficients and their standard errors for each of the three regimes. All coefficients in outer regimes
are significantly less than unity in absolute value, at 1 percent level of significance. Some of these
are not significantly different from zero. This implies that any deviations outside thresholds in all
markets considered here reverts back to the band, and that markets are rational.
My index of financial integration is presented in Table (7) below. What is immediately clear is
that all the developed countries rank higher than all the emerging markets in my sample. Among
emerging markets, Philippines, Chile and Mexico and India are the highest ranked, and South
Africa, Malaysia and Brazil the lowest ranked. Singapore’s low rank is contrary to its popular
image as a vibrant financial center, but not to the lesser known fact that trades in the Singapore
dollar remain tightly regulated and activity in the domestic interbank market is dominated by a
few banks. India’s fourth rank amongst the emerging markets would be a surprise for the Indian
regulators, but confirms the widely held belief among practitioners that capital is actually quite
fluid in that market. The other indices of integration rank India below Brazil in terms of openness,
whereas my Index puts India on top. Figure 3 makes clear why. While the estimated thresholds for
Brazil are narrower, perhaps because of fewer de-jure restrictions 19 there are nevertheless larger
19Note that there was furthur loosening of controls in Brazil in 2005, which is not reflected in the de-jure indices
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and more persistent deviations outside the band for Brazil than for India. These may be caused
by the same country and counterparty risks that also account for the existence of the offshore
non-deliverable market in Brazilian real. Furthurmore, access to onshore futures market in Brazil
requires traders to post local government bonds as collateral for their positions, multiplying their
exposure to onshore risk ((Lipscomb 2005)). My index is relatively highly correlated with the de-
jure indices of Chinn and Ito (2006) and Edwards (2005) with the correlations exceeding 0.7. It is
not so highly correlated with the quantitative measure of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), which
as I argued earlier, would be because one can expect quantity and price indices to be imperfectly
correlated and because the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) measure captures historical openness
as well as current openess. It is defined as the sum of external financial assets and liabilities over
GDP.
IV. Conclusions
The research presented here proposes a price-based index of financial openness that allows one
to rank different economies based on their de-facto integration with the world markets. It reveals a
much more rational global financial market than has been allowed for in previous studies. Although
all the emerging economies in my sample seem less integrated than the developed economies, in none
of them are deviations from CIP such as to reject efficient arbitrage, in the sense that any profitable
deviations are arbitraged away. The estimated coefficients on outer regimes are all significantly less
than one in absolute value. Among the emerging markets, Philippines and Chile show high degree
because their data ends in 2004. For a summary of de-jure restrictions and changes therein, see (Goldfajn and Minella
2005) and (Garcia 2006).
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of openness while Malaysia and Brazil are bottom ranked among the conomies for which data is
available.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: 1-Month CIP Deviations
Currency of N Mean Std. Error Variance Min Max Tsay F-Stat
Emerging Markets
Brazil 658 -1.53 0.27 47.80 -37.59 46.88 0.23
Hungary 1293 -2.13 0.11 15.02 -17.72 20.55 0.45
India 1900 -1.36 0.05 4.00 -12.89 7.91 49.05
Malaysia 27.91
Non-Crisis Period 1809 -0.07 0.04 3.38 -11.46 3.68 126.19
Crisis Period 682 -82.66 5.13 17921.67 -361.71 46.65 8.04
Philippines 20.11
Non-Crisis Period 1851 -2.46 0.06 7.03 -49.78 31.96 48.61
Crisis Period 269 -8.90 0.78 162.63 -117.76 33.93 13.12
Poland 1203 -1.65 0.11 13.26 -14.06 21.93 3.31
Singapore 15.57
Non-Crisis Period 2605 -0.31 0.05 6.23 -11.28 13.40 2.28
Crisis Period 377 -2.15 0.22 18.83 -25.51 12.13 6.10
Thailand 169.23
Non-Crisis Period 1995 -2.54 0.07 10.68 -37.97 14.73 43.75
Crisis Period 368 -16.00 1.12 462.94 -147.76 52.90 4.67
South Africa 2413 -3.40 0.11 29.36 -33.00 38.92 12.82
Developed Markets
Australia 3051 0.05 0.02 1.85 -16.69 17.14 4.75
Canada 3051 0.11 0.02 0.77 -10.93 7.80 7.56
Denmark 3051 0.09 0.03 2.45 -25.50 15.03 10.36
Euro Area 2021 0.08 0.03 1.66 -11.45 20.48 5.80
Hong Kong 2910 -0.08 0.01 0.53 -11.16 2.25 19.11
Japan 3051 0.35 0.05 6.51 -37.58 52.40 1.11
Norway 127.15
Non-Crisis Period 2772 0.16 0.05 7.60 -24.08 96.32 114.32
Crisis Period 279 0.44 0.04 0.49 -0.59 7.47 0.38
Sweden 3051 0.10 0.03 2.18 -24.03 20.79 21.78
Switzerland 3051 0.27 0.02 1.37 -12.40 10.90 19.58
United Kingdom 3051 -0.01 0.02 0.82 -17.06 10.13 11.09
Note. — USA is assumed to be home country and the deviations are on a per cent per annum basis. Crisis periods
excluded refer to 6 month windows around crisis months identified using Kaminsky and Reinhart(1999) criteria. F-
Statistic computed using arranged regressions as described in Tsay (1989). The null hypothesis is of no non-linearity
in the data. The 10 per cent critical value for degrees of freedom (2, inf) is 2.31.
Table 2. Summary Statistics: 3- Month CIP Deviations
Currency of N Mean Std. Error Variance Min Max Tsay F-Stat
Emerging Markets
Brazil 659 -0.71 0.11 7.46 -12.82 14.58 5.08
Chile 667 -0.56 0.05 1.68 -4.92 4.36 2.26
Hungary 1301 -1.09 0.04 1.86 -7.88 6.43 0.2
India 1920 0.13 0.03 1.93 -9.15 5.54 74.67
Mexico 1380 -0.91 0.07 5.89 -23.05 9.30 11.27
Philippines 43.33
Non-Crisis Period 1878 -0.81 0.02 0.90 -14.55 11.13 51.64
Crisis Period 271 -2.98 0.27 20.04 -38.18 10.89 10.07
Poland 1203 -0.67 0.04 1.49 -4.71 7.26 3.3
Singapore 68.57
Non-Crisis Period 2611 -0.12 0.02 0.74 -5.21 4.47 0.59
Crisis Period 380 -1.33 0.09 3.01 -9.46 3.36 4.03
South Africa 2547 -1.37 0.04 3.31 -11.38 12.34 14.67
Developed Markets
Australia 3051 0.06 0.01 0.53 -20.51 11.84 32.48
Canada 3051 0.08 0.01 0.10 -3.54 5.51 34.62
Denmark 3051 0.11 0.01 0.29 -8.48 5.11 14.3
Euro Area 2021 0.07 0.01 0.27 -8.88 6.99 11.63
Hong Kong 2910 -0.03 0.01 0.20 -4.87 13.70 186.92
Japan 3051 0.22 0.01 0.20 -6.07 12.93 34.56
Norway 102.01
Non-Crisis Period 2772 0.10 0.02 0.96 -7.92 32.58 92.66
Crisis Period 279 0.27 0.02 0.07 -0.14 2.58 0.9
Sweden 3051 0.13 0.01 0.31 -7.93 7.00 30.28
Switzerland 3051 -0.03 0.01 0.23 -5.91 7.12 59.71
United Kingdom 3051 0.03 0.01 0.09 -3.24 3.49 34.91
Note. — USA is assumed to be home country and the deviations are on a per cent per annum basis. Crisis periods
excluded refer to 6 month windows around crisis months identified using Kaminsky and Reinhart(1999) criteria. F-Statistic
computed using arranged regressions as described in Tsay (1989). The null hypothesis is of no non-linearity in the data.
The 10 per cent critical value for degrees of freedom (2, inf) is 2.31.
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Table 7. Integration Index
Country Integration Index Ranking Chinn-Ito LMF Edwards
Denmark 0.67 1 2.62 3.04 100
Canada 0.66 2 2.62 2.07 100
United Kingdom 0.62 3 2.62 5.96 100
Euro Area 0.58 4
Sweden 0.57 5 2.54 3.79 87.5
Australia 0.54 6 1.66 1.79 75
Switzerland 0.53 7 2.62 8.55 100
Japan 0.35 8 2.49 1.14 75
Hong Kong 0.34 9 2.62 11.93 102.5
Norway 0.19 10 2.35 2.29 100
Philippines 0.08 11 0.20 1.43 75
Chile -0.24 12 1.52 1.99 62.5
Mexico -0.27 13 0.72 0.79 62.5
India -0.31 14 -0.95 0.47 64.3
Singapore -0.39 15 2.42 8.04 96.4
Poland -0.45 16 0.20 1.03 50
Thailand -0.47 17 -0.05 1.43 39.1
Hungary -0.52 18 1.08 1.50 75
South Africa -0.68 19 -1.09 1.25 50
Malaysia -0.95 20 -0.01 2.05 64.1
Brazil -1.11 21 -0.05 0.89 62.5
Correlation with
Integration Index 0.78 0.38 0.72
Note. — The numbers for last three columns are the average of the respective indices over the sample
period of the Integration Index for each country. LMF refers to the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) index.
Fig. 1.A.— CIP Differentials, 1-Month Instruments
Fig. 1.B.— CIP Differentials, 1-Month Instruments
Fig. 2.— CIP Differentials, 3-Month Instruments
Fig. 3.A.— India and Brazil, CIP Differentials, 1-Month Instruments
Fig. 3.B.— India and Brazil, CIP Differentials, 3-Month Instruments
